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Principal Findings 
What’s new? Since August 2017, nearly 700,000 Rohingya have fled Myan-
mar’s brutal military operations in Rakhine State to Bangladesh, joining tens of 
thousands who left earlier in 2017. The two countries have set a framework for 
repatriation, but returns are unlikely any time soon. Indeed, small numbers of 
Rohingya continue to flee. 
Why does it matter? Failing to develop long-term strategies for the refugees 
poses the risk that hundreds of thousands of Rohingya will live in limbo or that 
Bangladeshi sentiment will turn against them. Authorities might attempt to force 
return to Myanmar or resettlement elsewhere, which could prompt violence on 
either side of the border. 
What should be done?  The Myanmar government must allow the UN and 
its partners access to northern Rakhine and ease security and other restrictions 
on the population. In Bangladesh, donors should continue humanitarian aid, 
while investing in the development of Cox’s Bazar district, which hosts the refu-
gees, to improve prospects for their future integration. 
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Executive Summary 
In the last eight months, nearly 700,000 Rohingya have fled indiscriminate and bru-
tal operations by Myanmar’s military in northern Rakhine State to Bangladesh, join-
ing tens of thousands who left earlier in 2017, and many more from previous years. 
The two countries have agreed upon a procedural framework for voluntary repatria-
tion, but no Rohingya have returned and small numbers continue to flee. The burden 
of the crisis may have shifted to Bangladesh, but the onus of responsibility remains 
squarely on Myanmar. The world must pursue accountability for crimes committed 
and press the government to create the conditions for voluntary repatriation. The 
tragic reality, however, is that the vast majority of refugees are unlikely to return in 
the foreseeable future, however much international opprobrium Myanmar faces. 
Planning for the refugees should proceed on that assumption, while efforts continue 
to protect those Rohingya who remain in Myanmar.  
Failing to develop long-term plans for the refugees would not only risk that hun-
dreds of thousands of people remain in limbo. It could also lead the status quo to 
morph in dangerous ways. For now, host communities and political elites in Bangla-
desh largely sympathise with the refugees, but if the sentiments of either were to 
shift – after the December elections, for example, or due to prolonged negative im-
pacts on host communities – the Rohingya might face pressure to return against 
their will or move into more isolated camps in Bangladesh, such as those the Bang-
ladeshi government is building on remote Bhasan island. Such developments could 
prompt instability or violence on either side of the border – due to organised resistance 
by refugees to relocation or premature repatriation, communal violence against 
returning refugees, or renewed ARSA mobilisation in Rakhine State. 
The social, political and strategic implications of this crisis for Bangladesh are 
complex at all levels. The host communities – neglected by Dhaka at the best of times 
– are already feeling the strain. While there is no disagreement in political and policy 
circles about the intractability of the crisis, there is widespread reluctance to acknowl-
edge it, as it would reflect badly on the Bangladeshi government’s ability to protect its 
sovereignty and could be interpreted as tacit acceptance of ethnic cleansing. Public 
sympathy for the Rohingya will not last forever, and the current situation is likely to 
evolve in unpredictable ways. After the December elections, the next government 
(likely to be the same as the present one) will have to make some difficult longer-term 
decisions. This subject will be covered in detail in a forthcoming report. 
Myanmar has constructed some of the infrastructure that could support a limited 
return, in the form of heavily guarded processing and holding camps. But it has done 
little if anything to create conditions on the ground that would give refugees, who 
fled abuses that likely constitute crimes against humanity, and who continue to be 
fearful and traumatised, the confidence to go back. It has bulldozed many burned 
Rohingya villages, is building new roads, power lines and security infrastructure 
across northern Rakhine State, and has promoted or allowed the expansion of exist-
ing villages and construction of new settlements inhabited by other ethnicities. The 
refugees’ return to their homes and lands thus is not only increasingly unlikely, but 
also becoming impossible in practice. Ethnic Rakhine political leaders and local 
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communities are staunchly opposed to repatriation, and the government has done 
little to mitigate their resistance (indeed, its own relations with ethnic Rakhine have 
soured). Moreover, hostility toward the Rohingya across Myanmar political elites and 
in society more broadly remains firmly entrenched.  
Most refugees express no intention to go to third countries, and in any case their 
opportunities to do so are likely to remain scarce. They want to return home. Many 
refugees hope that the unprecedented international attention their plight has re-
ceived over the past months could help them achieve that, but they are resigned to 
staying for an extended period in Bangladesh. 
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army militant group has significant networks 
of members and supporters in the Bangladesh camps, and appears determined to 
remain relevant as an insurgent and political force. The extent to which it can do so 
is uncertain. It launched a small cross-border attack on a Myanmar army convoy on 
5 January, but it has conducted no actions since then. Whether it can leverage wide-
spread disaffection and the significant sympathy it still enjoys in the camps into 
political authority and sustain cross-border attacks remains to be seen. There is no 
evidence it has established links to transnational groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda. In-
deed, viewing the situation in the camps through a counter-terrorism lens would be 
unhelpful, as the Bangladeshi authorities appear to recognise. 
Improving the situation in northern Rakhine State, where 100,000-150,000 Roh-
ingya still live (and on some estimates as many as 250,000), is not primarily a devel-
opment challenge. It depends on the Myanmar government and security forces chang-
ing course. For the Rohingya in northern Rakhine, particularly those in rural areas, 
life is becoming increasingly untenable. Curfews, checkpoints and movement restric-
tions mean that they cannot gain access to farms, fishing grounds, markets, day labour 
opportunities or social services. These people say they do not want to leave, but if the 
restrictions are not urgently eased, many may decide they have no other choice. 
To prevent further deterioration, the international community should continue 
pushing the government to allow unfettered United Nations and aid agency access to 
northern Rakhine. They should press for accountability for crimes committed by the 
security forces and others. It is also vital to ensure that the government changes 
conditions in northern Rakhine, to improve the prospects of an eventual refugee 
return, and more urgently to stabilise the situation of the Rohingya who remain, so 
as to prevent a further exodus. The recent appointment of a UN special envoy for 
Myanmar, combined with continued scrutiny and engagement from the Security 
Council – which just completed a visit to Bangladesh and Myanmar – can hopefully 
result in some progress on these issues. The recent statement from State Counsellor 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s office promising improved relations with the UN, together with 
the appointment of a new president, may open space for changes in the government’s 
approach. 
Realistically, however, the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who have fled to 
Bangladesh appear unlikely to return any time soon. Donors should prepare for the 
long haul. They should not only fund the humanitarian operation but also invest in 
the development of Cox’s Bazar district, where the refugees currently reside, to re-
duce the burden on host communities, minimise risks that local sentiment turns 
against refugees and create an environment more amenable to their integration. The 
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Bangladeshi government currently resists such an approach, given the domestic po-
litical costs of acknowledging that the Rohingya will remain indefinitely. Similarly, 
many Western governments are understandably loath to acknowledge explicitly that 
prospects of the refugees’ return are slim. But sustained political discussions on long-
term solutions between the government, donors and multilateral institutions are 
vital. Failing to develop plans for the Rohingya’s prolonged stay in Bangladesh risks 
worsening their suffering and propelling the crisis in a still more dangerous direction. 
Brussels, 16 May 2018 
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The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s 
Rohingya Refugee Crisis 
 Introduction 
Myanmar’s Rakhine State has long been afflicted by a toxic mixture of centre-periphery 
tensions, communal and religious conflict, and extreme poverty and underdevelop-
ment.1 In 2014, Crisis Group warned that the state’s turmoil represented “a signifi-
cant threat to the overall success of the country’s transition” away from military rule.2 
Muslims in Rakhine, particularly the Rohingya, have long been subject to state-spon-
sored discrimination and denial of rights, considered by Amnesty International to 
amount to apartheid, a crime against humanity.3 
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group, which also refers to 
itself as Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement), emerged in the wake of communal 
strife in 2012. It launched attacks on security posts in northern Rakhine in October 
2016 and August 2017. These attacks provoked an indiscriminate military response 
that the United Nations, foreign governments and human rights organisations have 
branded as ethnic cleansing, likely involving crimes against humanity and possibly 
genocide. Nearly 700,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017.4 
This report assesses the political and conflict dynamics at play in the refugee camps 
in Bangladesh and in Rakhine State, looks at how the crisis may evolve, and examines 
what options the Myanmar government and international community have for ad-
dressing it. It is based on research in Myanmar and Bangladesh since November 
2017, including interviews with diplomats and aid agency representatives; ARSA 
members; and more than 100 Rohingya refugees – women and men, educated and 
 
 
1 For detailed background on Rakhine State, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°s 292, Myanmar’s 
Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, 7 December 2017; 283, Myanmar: A New Mus-
lim Insurgency in Rakhine State, 15 December 2016; 261, Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, 
22 October 2014; and 251, The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar, 
1 October 2013. For other recent Crisis Group reporting on Myanmar, see Asia Briefings N°s 149, 
Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, 19 October 2016; 147, The Myanmar 
Elections: Results and Implications, 9 December 2015; also Asia Reports N°s 290, Buddhism and 
State Power in Myanmar, 5 September 2017; 287, Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar, 
29 June 2017; and 282, Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?, 29 July 2016. 
2 Crisis Group Report, The Politics of Rakhine State, op. cit., p. i. Rakhine State, in the west of 
Myanmar, is one of the poorest parts of the country. The extreme poverty is inseparable from anti-
Muslim discrimination, both by society and by government, through abusive regulations or bureau-
cratic procedures and practices. The state’s population of 3.2 million (2014 census) is made up of a 
majority of Rakhine Buddhists (around 60 per cent) and a significant minority of Muslims (around 
35 per cent). In northern parts of the state, prior to the recent exodus there was a large majority of 
Muslims. There are also a number of smaller minority groups in Rakhine, including Chin, Mro, 
Khami, Dainet, Maramagyi and Kaman.  
3 “‘Caged without a roof’: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State”, Amnesty International, Novem-
ber 2017. 
4 Inter Sector Coordination Group Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis, Cox’s Bazar, 26 April 
2018. 
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uneducated – in the Bangladesh camps, conducted by experienced personnel fluent 
in the Rohingya language. Some interviews were also conducted with Rohingya still 
living in northern Rakhine; these were carried out remotely due to access restrictions 
and the need to minimise risks to interviewees. The report examines the situation in 
northern Rakhine State, the prospects for refugees’ repatriation and conditions in the 
Bangladesh camps, including the status of ARSA. A forthcoming report will explore 
the challenges Bangladesh faces as a result of this sudden, massive influx of refugees, 
including in relation to the December 2018 Bangladeshi elections.  
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 Prospects for Repatriation 
The Myanmar and Bangladeshi governments have agreed upon a procedural frame-
work for refugee return, which was supposed to have started on 23 January and be 
completed “preferably within two years”.5 But the situation in Rakhine State is not 
conducive to repatriation and no refugee has returned through formal channels. This 
is unlikely to change in the short or medium term, and indeed Rohingya continue to 
leave Rakhine for Bangladesh. Nor does forced repatriation appear likely in the com-
ing months, given the Bangladeshi government’s calculation (discussed in section 
IV.A below) that such a step would be detrimental to its interests in the December 
elections and in securing donor backing for the huge humanitarian operation that 
supports the camps. The Awami League government has expressed sympathy for the 
Rohingya refugees in its campaign materials. 
The lack of returns has become the subject of diplomatic manoeuvring by both 
Myanmar and Bangladesh. Myanmar has repeatedly declared that the physical infra-
structure required for repatriation is in place, and that it is not responsible for any 
delay.6 But, as UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi told 
the UN Security Council on 13 January, “the construction of infrastructure to support 
the logistics of return should not be confused with the establishment of conditions 
conducive to voluntary repatriation”.7 UNHCR and most other UN agencies have had 
no access to northern Rakhine State since the start of the latest crisis in August 2017, 
though the government is holding discussions with UNHCR and the UN Develop-
ment Program, and has recently signalled following the UN Security Council visit 
that it is open to closer cooperation with the UN (see section V below). 
Bangladesh has reiterated its commitment to voluntary repatriation – that it will 
not force any Rohingya to return against their will – but has sought to test Myanmar’s 
willingness to accept returnees. A number of repatriation lists have been announced: 
 In late December, Bangladesh suggested it would send an initial list of 100,000 
Rohingya to be verified by Myanmar for repatriation. The list was to be drawn from 
a biometric database of refugees compiled by the Bangladeshi authorities. This 
database did not include household information, however, making it impossible 
to produce family-based lists, and the verification proposal was quietly dropped.8 
 On 15 January, Myanmar provided Bangladesh with a list of 508 Hindus that it 
wanted included in the first batch of returnees, as well as 750 Muslims whose 
residence in Myanmar it had verified. There was no indication that any of these 
 
 
5 The bilateral framework consists of a 23 November 2017 “Arrangement on Return of Displaced 
Persons from Rakhine State”; 19 December 2017 terms of reference for a “Joint Working Group”; 
and a 16 January 2018 “Physical Arrangement for Repatriation”, including a verification form that 
prospective returnees must fill out in advance. 
6 For example, “Diplomats, UN officials witness true situation in Rakhine State”, Global New Light 
of Myanmar [GNLM], 16 February 2018. 
7 “Briefing on Myanmar at the United Nations Security Council”, Filippo Grandi, UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, 13 February 2018; “Union official: the real Rakhine”, GNLM, 15 March 2018. 
8 Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Yangon and Dhaka, January 2018. See also “100,000 Roh-
ingya on first repatriation list”, Dhaka Tribune, 27 December 2017. 
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people wished to return to Myanmar, and Bangladesh has not proceeded with 
their repatriation.9 
 During the 15-17 February visit of the Myanmar home minister to Dhaka, Bang-
ladesh handed over a list of 1,673 Rohingya families (8,032 individuals) “to start 
the first phase of repatriation”. Myanmar says Bangladesh failed to use the agreed-
upon form, and omitted key identifying information – including declarations of 
willingness to voluntarily return – making it impossible to assess the list. Myan-
mar nevertheless announced in early April that it had verified 675 from the list as 
eligible for repatriation, although it is unclear if or when these people will return, 
and they were not asked if they are willing to do so.10 
The major obstacle to return remains fear. Crisis Group interviews in the last several 
months with Rohingya in the Bangladesh camps suggest that the vast majority of 
refugees want to return to their villages in Rakhine State as soon as conditions allow; 
few expressed a desire to go to third countries or settle permanently in Bangladesh. 
But the Rohingya are only willing to return if they can do so in safety and with dig-
nity. Many refugees said they had lost everything – homes, land, cattle, businesses 
and savings, as well as loved ones. They believe now is the time to secure their right 
to compensation for everything they have lost. They understand it will be difficult to 
obtain that right, but having no real alternatives, they are resigned to waiting and 
hoping.11 
Myanmar has done little to create an environment conducive to return. The in-
action begins with the fact that the government and military continue to deny the 
seriousness of the violence that occurred. Without an acceptance of the past, there 
can be no meaningful steps to ensure that the abuses will not happen again. The only 
official acknowledgement of wrongdoing relates to the extrajudicial executions of ten 
Rohingya men in Inn Din village, though the local Reuters journalists who exposed 
the case remain in prison facing charges under the Myanmar Official Secrets Act.12 
In a 19 March speech, the Myanmar Armed Forces’ commander-in-chief, Min Aung 
Hlaing, reinforced the view that the Rohingya are outsiders, saying they “do not have 
the characteristics or culture in common with the ethnicities of Myanmar”. The UN 
secretary-general expressed shock at these comments.13 
Rakhine Buddhists and other non-Muslims in the state remain staunchly opposed 
to any refugee return. Many across Myanmar share such views. A recent legislative 
 
 
9 Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Yangon and Dhaka, January 2018. See also “Myanmar says 
over 1,200 refugees to return from Bangladesh next week”, The Irrawaddy, 16 January 2018. 
10 “Union official: the real Rakhine”, GNLM, 15 March 2018; “Myanmar to accept over 600 refugees 
from Bangladesh”, Mizzima, 5 April 2018. 
11 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh, November 2017-March 2018. See also 
“‘I still don’t feel safe to go home’: Voices of Rohingya refugees”, Oxfam, 18 December 2017. 
12 “Tatmadaw investigation team issues statement on findings of discovery of unidentified bodies in 
Inndin Village cemetery in Maungtaw Township”, Naypyitaw, 10 January 2018; “Massacre in My-
anmar”, Reuters, 8 February 2018; “Myanmar police witness says searched Reuters reporter’s home 
‘for news’”, Reuters, 7 March 2018. 
13 “UN chief hits out at Myanmar army leader over comments”, AFP, 27 March. The commander-in-
chief referred to the Rohingya as “Bengalis”, a term widely used in Myanmar to imply that they are 
foreigners from Bangladesh. 
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debate provides a striking example of the strength of domestic sentiment against 
repatriation. On 14 March, the lower house debated a motion calling on the govern-
ment to review its decision to relocate 55 (Muslim) Kaman families from Rakhine 
State to Yangon. The families are among those who were displaced from towns in 
southern Rakhine by communal violence in 2012 and have been confined to camps 
since then. Unlike the Rohingya, the Kaman are a recognised ethnic minority who at 
least in principle enjoy full citizenship.  
Yet during the debate, a representative from the military bloc in the lower house 
expressed concern that “terrorists can pose as IDPs [internally displaced persons]”.14 
When originally proposing the motion on 5 March, a representative from the opposi-
tion Union Solidarity and Development Party compared the relocation to the “spread-
ing of cancer cells”.15 The motion was eventually defeated, with a government repre-
sentative pointing out that the Kaman are citizens and as such are entitled to live 
wherever they want in Myanmar but that the reason for their move to Yangon is that 
local officials have obstructed their return to their homes in southern Rakhine. Any 
return of Rohingya refugees, who face much greater bureaucratic and legal obstacles 
to establishing their citizenship, will face far fiercer opposition given the animosity 
toward them from a broad section of Myanmar society, local media and elites across 
the political spectrum. 
 
 
14 “MPs to discuss motion on reviewing resettlement of 55 households from IDP camps”, GNLM, 
6 March 2018; “Pyithu Hluttaw debates relocation of IDPs to Yangon”, GNLM, 15 March 2018.  
15 “Racist Myanmar MP: ‘Ethnic Kaman Muslims are cancer cells’”, M-Mediagroup.com, 6 March 
2018. 
The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°296, 16 May 2018 Page 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 Situation in the Bangladesh Camps 
The lack of any realistic prospect of repatriation means that the Rohingya refugees 
will remain in the Bangladesh camps for an extended period. The conditions in those 
camps are dire, and they are likely to remain so despite a huge and costly interna-
tional humanitarian operation projected at around $1.2 billion per year. 
That operation has succeeded in providing emergency food, shelter, water, sanita-
tion, health and protection services to some 900,000 refugees, while tackling diph-
theria and measles outbreaks.16 Yet the reality is that the camps, the largest and most 
densely populated refugee settlements in the world, were not planned and are not 
suitable for habitation. Much of the area is rapidly cleared forest land, vulnerable to 
landslides and at serious risk from cyclones. Makeshift shelters, water supply points 
and latrines could be flooded or overwhelmed by monsoon rains that will arrive im-
minently. A large preparation effort is underway, but it faces fundamental constraints 
of geography.17 
Most refugees in the camps have had little time to consider the future. They have 
been focused on daily survival. Now they are preparing for the rains – many arrived 
at the tail end of the last monsoon season and are aware of the impending challeng-
es, and there have already been some storms. Most count on international concern 
translating into real improvements in their prospects for return. A major fear remains 
the possibility of forced repatriation, which occurred following the 1978 and 1991-
1992 exoduses, exacerbated by the diplomatic manoeuvring between Bangladesh 
and Myanmar described above.18 
A. Leadership and Governance in the Camps 
Given the chaos of the 2017 exodus, and the difficult conditions on arrival in Bangla-
desh, leadership and governance structures among refugees have been somewhat ad 
hoc. Village populations generally did not arrive in the camps together, and there-
fore are not living together, prompting the emergence of new geographically based 
leaderships. 
There has long been a system of informal leadership in the Rohingya camps in 
Bangladesh, known as the majhi (traditional leader) system. This system was estab-
lished at the time of the last major refugee flight in 1991-1992, but it was bedevilled 
by corruption and the majhis’ abuse of power. In 2007 the majhis were replaced with 
elected camp committees with a facilitation rather than decision-making role.19 
In the initial stages of the latest exodus, before the aid operation kicked in, the 
delivery of assistance was disorganised; refugees living close to main roads received 
 
 
16 The 900,000 figure includes approximately 700,000 who have arrived since August 2017; several 
tens of thousands who arrived earlier in 2017; and others who have arrived in recent years. 
17 “UN launches 2018 appeal for Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi host communities”, joint 
UNHCR/International Organisation for Migration press release, 16 March 2018. 
18 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh, November 2017-March 2018. For dis-
cussion of repatriation following the 1978 and 1992 exoduses, see Crisis Group Report, The Politics 
of Rakhine State, op. cit., section II.C; “The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a cycle of exodus?”, Human 
Rights Watch, September 1996. 
19 “Rohingya crisis: Situation analysis”, ACAPS, November 2017. 
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goods from well-wishers, whereas those in less accessible areas received little. When 
the Bangladeshi army took charge of crisis management in mid-September, it instruct-
ed refugees to select a majhi for each group of 50-200 households. Those chosen 
were tasked, among other things, with drawing up family lists that the army used as 
the basis for food distribution.20 
These majhis are now the lowest level of political organisation in the camps, the 
primary dispute resolution mechanism (sometimes supported by committees of 
elders that they arrange), and the interface between refugees and the Bangladeshi 
authorities and aid agencies. Above them are two further levels: “head majhis” (rep-
resenting larger “blocks” within the camps) and “chairmen” (representing entire 
camps, or sections of larger camps). Since it is often not feasible for authorities to 
deal individually with the hundreds of majhis, many interactions are at the level of 
head majhis or chairmen.21 All of these leaders are men. While refugees with whom 
Crisis Group spoke expressed no serious grievances against the majhis, the potential 
for abuses of power similar to those that blighted the system in the past is clear.22 
While the majhis have the greatest day-to-day influence over refugees’ lives, local 
Bangladeshi power-holders also have significant clout – including current and for-
mer local government officials. Some of these individuals were implicated in the ear-
ly days of the exodus in allegedly taking money from arriving refugees to allow them 
to put up shelters on government and forest land, though a number of them have 
denied the charges as politically motivated. These reported scams were mostly shut 
down by the Bangladeshi army when it stepped in. Nevertheless, these local power-
holders are likely to continue controlling some aspects of the political economy 
related to the refugees.23 
The Bangladeshi army and intelligence service have asserted their authority in 
the camps and environs, through perimeter controls, checkpoints and informants – 
albeit with a focus on major security threats rather than low-level criminality, which 
is mostly handled by the majhis. The majhis have also organised a system of volun-
teer night watchmen or sentries, at the request of the army and local magistrates. 
Sentries are provided with a torch, jacket and baton, with each sentry responsible for 
a block; they report through the majhis to the army each morning.24 
ARSA is a significant presence in the camps. That ARSA members and supporters 
are there is unsurprising, given that the militant group had firmly established itself 
in Rohingya villages across northern Rakhine. Its members were recruited from and 
lived in those villages – and fled to the Bangladesh camps with the rest of the popu-
 
 
20 Crisis Group interviews, refugees and representatives of humanitarian aid agencies, Bangladesh, 
November 2017-March 2018. 
21 To give a sense of numbers, in the Balukhali mega-camp which hosts more than half a million 
refugees, there are over 800 blocks, each represented by a head majhi. 
22 Crisis Group interviews, refugees and representatives of humanitarian aid agencies, Bangladesh, 
November 2017-March 2018. Due to the risk that majhis may be unrepresentative or corrupt, some 
aid agencies have established parallel project structures that do not automatically go through the 
majhis. 
23 Crisis Group interviews, refugees and representatives of humanitarian aid agencies, Bangladesh, 
November 2017-March 2018. See also “Extortion adds to Rohingyas’ woes”, New Age Bangladesh, 
26 September 2017.  
24 Ibid. 
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lation. A small number of senior leaders and prominent cadres avoided entering the 
camps or being biometrically registered by the Bangladeshi authorities. These men 
stayed out of the camps as a security precaution and to be able to move more freely.25  
What has been less certain is the extent to which ARSA would be able to regroup 
in the camps, mobilise the population and project its authority. It was able to do so in 
Rakhine State by leveraging the anger and desperation of a community facing daily 
oppression, and by building strong networks through prominent local community 
and religious leaders. It offered hope, or at least a sense of agency, and bolstered its 
position via a combination of religious legitimacy and fear.26 Mobilising in the Bang-
ladesh camps is a completely different prospect. Village populations are scattered 
across the camps, new leaders (the majhis) are emerging, and the “common enemies” 
that ARSA rallied against – the Myanmar security forces – are far away across an 
international border. When the majority of refugees are struggling to establish basic 
standards of living in the camps and come to terms with the catastrophe triggered by 
ARSA’s last major action, the militant group’s raison d’être has undoubtedly been 
weakened. 
ARSA’s attack on a Myanmar military convoy in northern Rakhine State on 5 Jan-
uary 2018 demonstrated its determination to remain relevant as a fighting force.27 
Its immediate statement claiming responsibility, and its subsequent statement the 
same month rejecting repatriation proposals, also made an apparent attempt to 
position the group as the political voice of the Rohingya.28  
There is evidence, albeit thus far limited, that ARSA is organising in the Bangladesh 
camps. First, some acts of violence in the camps can be plausibly linked to ARSA. 
There have been a small number of killings of majhis and other leaders attributed in 
the media to criminals or to the fact that the victims were working with the Bangla-
deshi authorities on potential returns. It seems, however, that in at least a few of these 
cases, the person killed may have been on an ARSA hit list since before the exodus.29 
Second, ARSA members themselves claim to have influence over the majhis. In-
deed, it would be surprising if some of the majhis were not linked even more directly 
to the group given the extent of ARSA’s previous mobilisation and support in Rakhine 
State – and its success in imposing its will through violence. This combination of 
persuasion and targeted violence is precisely analogous to ARSA’s earlier tactics in 
 
 
25 Crisis Group interviews, refugees, ARSA members and representatives of humanitarian agencies, 
Bangladesh, November 2017-March 2018. Refugees are able to move freely within and between 
camps, but they are restricted from travelling to Cox’s Bazar or Chittagong, except with medical 
referral. It has up to now been easy for them to travel to the town of Teknaf, but since early March 
soldiers at checkpoints have started asking about reasons for travel. 
26 See Crisis Group Report, A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, op. cit. 
27 “Five security personnel injured in ambush attack in Northern Rakhine”, GNLM, 6 January 2018. 
28 ARSA press statements, “Turaing ambush against the Burmese terrorist army”, 7 January 2018; 
and “Burmese terrorist government’s unreasonable repatriation plan for Rohingya refugees from 
Bangladesh”, 20 January 2018. Available on the group’s Twitter account, @ARSA_Official. 
29 Crisis Group interviews, refugees, ARSA members and others with knowledge of the situation, 
Bangladesh, November 2017-March 2018. See also “Rohingya leader shot dead in Cox’s Bazar”, 
Dhaka Tribune, 20 January 2018; “Second camp ‘leader’ killed in Bangladesh refugee camp”, AFP, 
23 January 2018; “Bangladesh tightens security in Rohingya camps”, The Irrawaddy, 2 February 
2018. 
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Myanmar. Another opportunity for ARSA to exert its influence is through its mem-
bers or supporters volunteering as night watchmen. Finally, religious leaders – some 
of whom were key ARSA community mobilisers and leaders in Rakhine State – con-
tinue to be important in the camps.30 
ARSA’s presence in the camps does not, however, imply that it can sustain an in-
surgency in Rakhine State, even if that were to remain its main focus, which itself 
is not certain. The strong presence of Bangladeshi army and intelligence personnel 
in and around the camps, plus the geography of the area and its high population 
density, means that ARSA will find it difficult to reorganise in Bangladesh without 
the authorities knowing. Now that the majority of the Rohingya population is in 
Bangladesh with little prospect of return, other objectives, notably organising to lobby 
for improved living conditions and opportunities in Bangladesh, are likely to assume 
greater importance for refugees – and hence for any group that draws its constituency 
from them – than mobilising for an insurgency across the border. Much, therefore, 
depends on how the political situation in Bangladesh evolves. 
B. Refugee Views on ARSA and the Use of Violence 
Detailed Crisis Group discussions with refugees indicate that the tragedy that has 
befallen the Rohingya, sparked by the ARSA attacks, has influenced perceptions of 
ARSA in different ways. Some refugees adopt the view that, whether or not those 
attacks had taken place, the Myanmar authorities would have found a way to drive 
them from their land. Others believe that the Rohingya lost everything as a result of 
the attacks, while gaining nothing. Many expressed the hope that something positive 
might come from their plight, as the Rohingya have never before received so much 
global attention. “Finally, the world has learned how much we have been suffering” 
was a commonly aired sentiment.31 
Many of those who had supported or engaged in ARSA’s resistance saw violence 
as a last resort. They believed that ARSA’s rationale was bolstered by fatwas (religious 
judicial opinions or binding religious edicts) from Rohingya clerics in Rakhine State 
and in the diaspora declaring armed struggle to be legitimate or even obligatory. On 
the other hand, other voices among the Rohingya, including leading clerics, had long 
counselled against violence and continue to do so.32 
This question was the subject of a detailed media report in Bangladesh in March 
2018.33 The article cited the issuance of a fatwa by 47 Rohingya muftis (Islamic schol-
ars who interpret religious law) condemning any act of jihad, even for self-defence, 
against Myanmar.34 It stated that Deobandi madrassas in Bangladesh, India and Pa-
 
 
30 Crisis Group interviews, refugees, ARSA members and others with knowledge of the situation, 
October 2017-March 2018. 
31 Crisis Group interviews, refugees, October 2017-March 2018. 
32 See Crisis Group Reports, The Politics of Rakhine State and A New Muslim Insurgency in 
Rakhine State, op. cit. 
33 “Rohingya muftis prohibit jihad and self-defense”, Dhaka Tribune, March 2018. 
34 The Arabic root of “jihad” refers to striving in God’s service. Many Muslims find its use in the 
political violence context imprecise and offensive, reducing a complex religious concept to war-
making. In reference to violence, it can encompass insurgency and guerrilla war as well as terror-
ism. For the vast majority of Muslims, today’s “jihadists” pervert Islam’s tenets. But it is hard to escape 
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kistan backed the fatwa (Deobandi Islam is a Sunni revivalist movement to which the 
most influential Rohingya clerics adhere). 
There has always been, and continues to be, a strong current of thought among 
Rohingya that opposes any form of violent resistance. Yet two considerations are rel-
evant to assessing whether the fatwa represents a significant shift in sentiment away 
from ARSA and militancy among the Rohingya. First, it is not new; it was issued in 
October 2017, at the height of the exodus, a time when Rohingya leaders felt it was 
vital to reassure Bangladesh that the refugees did not represent a security threat. 
Second, the fatwa did not categorically reject the idea of violent resistance; it did, 
however, caution against it at the time of issuance. That is, it was not a rejection of 
ARSA as such, but rather of particular tactics the signatories viewed as premature or 
misguided.35 
Many observers have expressed concern about the risk of transnational jihadist 
groups – that is, groups such as al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, the Islamic 
State or their Bangladeshi affiliates – exploiting the Rohingya crisis to mobilise or 
recruit in the camps. While this concern is legitimate, given the security landscape 
in Bangladesh, there is no evidence that such exploitation is happening, nor that a 
counterterrorism lens is useful for understanding the evolving situation in the camps. 
ARSA has always distanced itself from transnational jihadism, and the group, its 
members and refugees interviewed continue to do so.36 The Bangladeshi authorities 
share this assessment.37 
 
 
the term. Groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS self-identify as “jihadist”, and while jihad has long been 
an element of virtually all schools of Islam, a nascent “jihadist” ideology has emerged that is more 
than a reflection of this history; ideologues borrow from other traditions and at times show frustra-
tion with Salafi doctrinal rigidity that might constrain combat tactics. Though big differences exist, 
“jihadist” groups share some tenets: that fighting to return society to a purer Islam is proper; that 
violence against rulers whose policies they deem in conflict with Islamic imperatives as they under-
stand them is justified; and that, in fact, there is a duty to use violence if Muslim rulers abandon 
those imperatives. This report’s use of “jihadist” is not meant to add legitimacy to this interpreta-
tion or to detract from efforts to promote alternative interpretations. For more about Crisis Group’s 
use of this term, see Crisis Group Special Report N°1, Exploiting Disorder: Al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State, 14 March 2016, p. 2. 
35 Crisis Group interviews, muftis who signed the fatwa, Bangladesh, March 2018. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Crisis Group interviews, Bangladesh intelligence official, Dhaka, April 2018; Bangladesh security 
officials, Cox’s Bazar, January 2018. This assessment will be examined in greater detail in a forth-
coming Crisis Group report on the challenges the Rohingya crisis poses for Bangladesh. 
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 What Next for the Crisis? 
A. In Bangladesh 
There is little prospect that the situation in Rakhine State will improve sufficiently in 
the near future for voluntary repatriation to be conceivable. The future of the refu-
gees is thus very much dependent on developments in Bangladesh. 
Little suggests Bangladeshi authorities are inclined to force refugees back to My-
anmar. Sympathy for the Rohingya among the Bangladeshi populace remains wide-
spread, and the government calculates that pressure on the refugees to return would 
be ill advised in an election year.38 It would also damage relations with donor coun-
tries that are funding the $1.2 billion per year humanitarian operation. Public opinion 
and government calculations could easily shift, however. Two factors will be espe-
cially important.  
First is the sentiment of the host community in Cox’s Bazar. Currently, relations 
between refugees and locals are relatively good – better, in fact, than during the 
1990s crisis, even though the numbers of refugees now are far higher. But continued 
positive relations cannot be taken for granted. In the two sub-districts where the ref-
ugee camps are located (Ukhia and Teknaf), refugees outnumber the local popula-
tion two to one. The rapid influx has placed a huge burden on the host community – 
prices have risen, day labour rates gone down, farmlands been lost, transport times 
lengthened, and deforestation and environmental degradation worsened. Locals 
worry about the health and security implications of the camps. Their sympathy could 
easily dry up as the crisis becomes protracted.39 
Second is whether sentiment in Bangladesh as a whole and the government’s 
stance in particular shifts after the elections. This could happen even if the current 
Awami League government holds onto power, which seems likely. Bangladesh has 
always insisted that the refugees must return to Myanmar, and it has rejected the idea 
of local integration. Pressure on refugees to return to Myanmar remains a future 
possibility, even if the Bangladeshi population and government for now largely wel-
come them. 
At the same time, Bangladesh has made clear that it is making contingency ar-
rangements. It has moved forward with a $280 million plan to resettle 100,000 Roh-
ingya refugees on an isolated and flood-prone island, Bhasan Char, in the Bay of Ben-
gal. The Bangladeshi navy issued a tender on 24 November 2017 for development of 
the island camp and necessary flood defences; the government says it has no time-
line for the development – indeed, no allocation from the budget has reportedly yet 
been secured40 – and that no Rohingya will be moved against their will. The plan has 
alarmed aid agencies, however, who have concerns about the site’s suitability and 
 
 
38 Crisis Group interview, opinion polling professional, Dhaka, April 2018. This assessment will be 
examined in a forthcoming Crisis Group report on the challenges the Rohingya crisis poses for 
Bangladesh. 
39 Crisis Group interviews, members of local community and refugees, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 
November 2017-March 2018. See also “Rohingya refugees test Bangladeshi welcome as prices rise 
and repatriation stalls”, Reuters, 28 February 2018. 
40 Crisis Group interview, member of Bangladeshi civil society who has closely followed the matter, 
May 2018. 
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the difficulty of access to it. Refugees strongly oppose moving to the island, but they 
seem to think that the scheme will never get off the ground. If their relocation were 
to appear imminent, serious resistance could be anticipated.41 Demonstrations 
already took place in January, when refugees believed they might be pressured to 
repatriate.42 
In general, refugees have strong communications networks and, despite being 
mostly illiterate (the Rohingya language has no written form in general usage), have 
access to considerable information about their predicament and the attendant inter-
national debate. Almost all refugee families also have access to a smartphone – like 
Myanmar as a whole, which has one of the world’s highest smartphone penetration 
rates.43 These devices are now connected to Bangladeshi networks through SIM 
cards purchased on the black market (refugees are officially prohibited from pur-
chasing a Bangladeshi SIM card). WhatsApp serves as essentially the sole means of 
communication for Rohingya, mostly via sharing of audio files and video clips. Most 
refugees are members of multiple WhatsApp groups, giving them access to news and 
religious teachings, as well as a connection to their families, including those still in 
Myanmar or in other countries.44 Some of these WhatsApp groups also could serve 
as a means of coordination and mobilisation, particularly should the refugees face 
major challenges, such as forced repatriation or resettlement to the island.  
To the extent that refugees have had time to think about their future in any detail, 
most say they want to return to Rakhine State but are resigned to the fact that they 
may have to wait for an extended period in Bangladesh before that is possible. Very 
few express an intention to go to third countries. In any case, possibilities for doing 
so are limited: the smuggling route by boat across the Bay of Bengal to Malaysia 
remains extremely difficult, the land route via India across Myanmar to Thailand is 
expensive and fraught with peril, and only a handful of refugees have the resources 
and connections to leave by air. Informal integration in Bangladesh is also more 
difficult than in the past. Authorities now restrict marriages between refugees and 
locals, and because Bangladesh IDs are now biometric, they are more difficult and 
expensive to obtain on the black market than they were previously. Some refugees 
have avoided entering the camps and being registered, to make it easier to move around 
and to leave – but their number appears to be very small (it includes some senior 
ARSA members, as mentioned above).45 
 
 
41 Crisis Group interviews, refugees and aid agency representatives, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, No-
vember 2017-March 2018. See also “Floating island: New home for Rohingya refugees emerges in 
Bay of Bengal”, Reuters, 22 February 2018; “Dhaka bemoans lack of funding for Rohingya refugee 
island”, Reuters, 27 March 2018. 
42 “Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh protest repatriation move”, AFP, 20 January 2018. 
43 Smartphone penetration in Myanmar is 80 per cent, significantly higher than in its neighbours 
(Singapore is 78 per cent and Thailand 59 per cent). Realizing Digital Myanmar, Telenor, February 
2018. 
44 Of the many WhatsApp groups, some connect people from a particular village in Rakhine (eg, the 
Taung Bazar group and the Badanar group); others are content-based, such as the Rohingya Ettafaq 
(Unity) group, the Rohingya social media group, the Arakan Azad (Freedom) group and the Roh-
ingya National news group. 
45 Crisis Group interviews, refugees and analysts, Bangladesh, November 2017-March 2018. 
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B. In Northern Rakhine State 
Beyond building the physical infrastructure to support limited returns, Myanmar 
has made no real progress in creating conditions on the ground that would give refu-
gees the confidence to return. In the meantime, among the 100,000-150,000 Roh-
ingya remaining in northern Rakhine, a few thousand per month continue to leave 
for Bangladesh. 
Rohingya in northern Rakhine report that they have no wish to leave unless cir-
cumstances compel them to do so. Those that are leaving cite reasons including their 
inability to obtain food or medical treatment for serious illness or injury; the confis-
cation of their land; and accusations by the authorities that a family member is an 
ARSA member.46 Recent arrivals from north Rathedaung and south Buthidaung 
reported fleeing due to food shortages and land confiscation (such as for a new bor-
der guard police base in Ah Lel Chaung village-tract). They also relate that while 
there are no direct threats from police or security forces, continued discrimination 
and restrictions make it impossible to continue trade and rural livelihoods. The rural 
economy has virtually collapsed, and poor people say they have to survive on the few 
day labour opportunities remaining or rely on remittances from family or friends in 
Yangon or overseas.47 
Much of Maungdaw township’s rural areas and other parts of northern Rakhine 
are now virtually depopulated. These areas will not remain as they are, frozen in 
time pending eventual repatriation in the months or years to come. Many villages 
were burned to the ground, and those – as well as some that were not burned – are 
now being bulldozed and trees and vegetation uprooted. Non-Muslim villages are 
expanding and new migrants arriving, with some new villages being constructed on 
what were Rohingya villages and lands. The government, or private companies un-
der their direction, are constructing new roads and extending the electrical grid. The 
military and Border Guard Police are rolling out additional security infrastructure. 
The government is pushing for development projects and Myanmar conglomerates 
have been encouraged to look at business opportunities in the area. Whether these 
activities reflect a government strategy to remake northern Rakhine as a Buddhist-
majority area – as some rights groups and other observers have claimed and as Rakhine 
nationalists have advocated – is unclear.48 But whatever the motives, the conse-
quence will be that with boundaries and landmarks erased, refugees’ return to their 
original homes and lands will be near impossible, and the possibility of any return at 
all greatly reduced. 
 
 
46 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya villagers in northern Rakhine State and recently arrived refugees 
in Bangladesh, January-March 2018. See also “Confidential briefing note on the Maung Nu massacre 
and its aftermath”, Arakan Project, 22 February 2018 (non-public); and “Remaking Rakhine state,” 
Amnesty International, March 2018. 
47 Ibid.  
48 For details of the changes that are taking place, see “Remaking Rakhine state”, Amnesty Interna-
tional, March 2018. See also “Burma is pumping millions into rebuilding Rakhine, but is it for the 
Rohingya?”, Washington Post, 14 March 2018; “With Rohingya gone, Myanmar’s ethnic Rakhine 
seek Muslim-free ‘buffer zone’”, AFP, 16 March 2018; “‘We have no intention of hiding anything’: 
Myanmar rebuilding in Maungdaw, Rakhine state”, Channel News Asia, 20 March 2018. 
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In the meantime, relations between the (Buddhist) ethnic Rakhine population 
and the government have deteriorated sharply in 2018. The Rakhine State crisis thus 
has become three-sided, pitting not only the Rakhine against the Rohingya but My-
anmar authorities against both, which further undermines prospects of stability and 
of addressing the Rohingya’s plight. Two incidents in particular have ignited ethnic 
Rakhine anger. First was a police crackdown in January on an anti-government 
demonstration in the ancient Rakhine capital of Mrauk-U that left seven Rakhine 
participants dead and at least a dozen hospitalised; they had been protesting a gov-
ernment decision to ban events commemorating the 223rd anniversary of the fall of 
the Arakan Kingdom. The shootings were followed two days later by the arrest of the 
most prominent Rakhine politician, the lower house MP Dr Aye Maung, for comments 
at a literature festival that the authorities said were seditious and supportive of the 
Arakan Army. He and a second person were subsequently charged with high treason, 
which carries a mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment.49 
The perceived lack of a credible government response or accountability for the 
police shooting, and Dr Aye Maung’s ongoing prosecution in Sittwe court, both con-
tinue to inflame local sentiment. On 30 January, the Mrauk-U administrator was 
stabbed to death, likely because of his perceived role in the crackdown. In the early 
hours of 24 February, three bombs exploded in Sittwe, at locations that appeared 
to target the government – near a senior official’s home, a court and a government 
office, respectively. A policeman was injured. Three other devices were found and 
deactivated. No group claimed responsibility but there has been widespread specula-
tion that it may have been the Arakan Army, the only group seen as having the motive 
and capacity. If it is responsible, the murder and bombings would mark a significant 
escalation for a group that normally only attacks military targets in rural areas. On 
17 January, it had issued a statement threatening “serious retaliatory measures” 
against those responsible for the Mrauk-U shootings.50 
At a time when it must grapple with unprecedented challenges in Rakhine State, 
the government now faces the additional problem of deepening Rakhine nationalist 
disaffection, which could tip into instability or violence. The government would be 
well advised to ease tensions with the Rakhine community. Of course, this should 
not include acquiescing to Rakhine demands that are contrary to human rights norms 
or Myanmar’s international legal obligations; nor should it detract from the obliga-
tion to hold Rakhine politicians or anyone else accountable for hate speech or inciting 
violence. But the government should review its high treason prosecutions against 
Aye Maung and his co-accused, which may not serve the public interest at this time, 
and ensure there is accountability for the police shootings in Mrauk-U.  
 
 
49 Burma Penal Code section 122, as amended by Burma Act XX, 1950. Death sentences are still 
handed down, but judicial executions are no longer carried out in Myanmar. For details on the inci-
dents, see “7 people reported dead after police crackdown on protest in Mrauk-U”, The Irrawaddy, 
17 January 2018; “MP, author charged with high treason”, The Irrawaddy, 9 February 2018. 
50 United League of Arakan/Arakan Army statement, 17 January 2018. See also “Three bombs rock 
Myanmar’s northwestern city Sittwe, policeman injured”, Reuters, 24 February 2018. 
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 Role of the International Community 
The Rohingya crisis presents a significant dilemma for the international community. 
On one hand, it is vital to insist on the right of the Rohingya to return home and 
Myanmar’s obligation to create conditions conducive to that, as well as to pursue 
accountability. On the other, no voluntary repatriation is feasible for the foreseeable 
future, which means concerted efforts are required to ease the burden on Bangladesh 
and provide alternative options for the refugees.  
Until now, many countries have been concerned that explicitly acknowledging 
that the refugees are unlikely to go home would relieve pressure on Myanmar to 
accept them back and could be seen as rewarding the architects of ethnic cleansing. 
But the harsh reality is that concerted international pressure thus far has not altered 
Myanmar’s political stance on this issue and even such increased efforts as could be 
plausibly achieved – given that China and Russia remain opposed to any punitive 
action from the Security Council – are highly unlikely to do so. The risk of failing to 
develop long-term strategies for the refugees now is not just that hundreds of thou-
sands of people will continue to live in limbo. It is also that the status quo could 
morph in dangerous ways.51 If host communities or national political sentiment in 
Bangladesh turns against the refugees, the government may pressure them to return 
against their will or force them into more isolated camps in Bangladesh, such as those 
being constructed on Bhasan island. Such developments could prompt instability or 
violence on either side of the border – in Bangladesh, because the refugees would 
resist, perhaps even violently, and in Myanmar, because a forced return could lead to 
communal clashes with hostile non-Muslim communities and could prompt ARSA to 
mobilise in support of returnees. 
In Bangladesh, it is vital that international donors not only support the humani-
tarian operation by funding the Joint Response Plan,52 but also that they invest heavily 
in development support for the affected part of Bangladesh, to reduce the burden on 
local communities and the government and to create an environment more condu-
cive to any future local integration. 
In Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the situation needs to be stabilised so that the lives 
and livelihoods of the Rohingya and other Muslim communities who remain – in all 
parts of the state – are more secure and the exodus to Bangladesh from the north of 
the state ends. This challenge is not primarily one of development, but one of policy. 
As an immediate step in northern Rakhine, the government needs to ease the draco-
nian restrictions on freedom of movement – curfews, checkpoints and other imped-
iments – so that agriculture, fishing and trading can resume in rural areas and there 
is better access to services. It should follow through on promises of closer coopera-
tion by providing unfettered access to the UN and its international NGO partners – 
including by quickly reaching agreement on the memorandum of understanding it is 
discussing with UNHCR and the UN Development Program. In the longer term, the 
 
 
51 See Crisis Group Report, Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, op. cit. 
52 The Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, launched by UNHCR and IOM 
in March 2018, is an appeal for $951 million to support the humanitarian operation for Rohingya 
refugees in Bangladesh for the period March-December 2018 (http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/ 
20415). 
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only credible solution is progress on desegregation, citizenship and equality in all parts 
of Rakhine State, as outlined in the report of the Rakhine Advisory Commission 
chaired by Kofi Annan. 
The UN Security Council visit to Bangladesh and Myanmar from 29 April to 1 May 
demonstrates the deep concern of Council members and will likely strengthen their 
commitment to ongoing scrutiny of the situation.53 The UN secretary-general’s 
appointment in advance of the visit of a special envoy for Myanmar, Swiss diplomat 
Christine Schraner Burgener, gives the UN an important new avenue for political 
engagement with the government.54 These developments – in particular, a strategic 
combination of continued Council scrutiny with sustained diplomatic engagement by 
the special envoy – could create new opportunities to make at least some progress on 
the immediate steps outlined above. Indeed, at the end of the Security Council visit 
to Myanmar, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi issued a press release stating that 
“this is the appropriate time” for strengthened cooperation with the UN on Rakhine 
State and expressing confidence that the Council’s visit would be “an important 
turning point in this regard”.55 This signal, along with the appointment of President 
Win Myint at the end of March 2018, which could lead to redistribution of political 
authority in the government, may open space for changes in the government’s ap-
proach. Progress on longer-term solutions through implementation of the Annan 
Commission recommendations will remain extremely difficult. 
 
 
53 For a summary of the visit, see the series of “dispatches from the field” by Security Council Re-
port, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/myanmar. 
54 “Secretary-General Appoints Christine Schraner Burgener of Switzerland as Special Envoy on 
Myanmar”, UN Press Release, 26 April 2018. 
55 Press Release, Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor, Naypyitaw, 1 May 2018. 
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 Conclusion 
The massive exodus of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh has slowed to a few hundred 
per week. But no repatriation has taken place or appears likely. The large majority of 
Rohingya are now in Bangladesh, living as refugees in squalid mega-camps. The threat 
of landslides and floods looms large as the monsoon and cyclone season approaches, 
with a concomitant risk of waterborne disease. Those who remain in northern Rakhine 
State are in a precarious position, unable to move freely or sustain livelihoods; many 
may be forced to flee to Bangladesh in the coming weeks and months. 
Efforts to pursue accountability – whether through the International Criminal 
Court or other mechanisms – remain vital, as does pressing Myanmar to improve the 
situation in northern Rakhine and create conditions conducive to voluntary return. 
At the same time, large-scale voluntary returns for now are highly unlikely. The im-
perative must be to find sustainable solutions for the refugees in Bangladesh. In ad-
dition to supporting the humanitarian operation, donors should invest in developing 
the affected area of Bangladesh to help host communities and to create conditions 
amenable to local integration. The reluctance of the international actors to openly 
acknowledge that the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya forced out by Myanmar’s 
military operations are unlikely to return any time soon is understandable. But the 
lack of sustained political discussions and concrete planning for the refugees’ extended 
stay in Bangladesh risks worsening their plight and could propel the crisis in a dan-
gerous new direction.  
Brussels, 16 May 2018 
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